Force Majeure in Türkiye and Malaysia: Legal Treatment, Drafting Strategies, and Post-Pandemic Lessons for Commercial Contracts

1. INTRODUCTION

Force majeure has moved from being a relatively specialized contractual topic to one of the most practically important concepts in commercial law. The COVID-19 pandemic, large-scale supply chain disruptions, geopolitical conflicts, and regulatory shutdowns have all forced parties, counsel, and courts to revisit a basic question: when can a party be excused from performance because events beyond its control have intervened?

In Türkiye, the answer is not found in a single statutory definition. Instead, the legal treatment of force majeure is shaped by a combination of:

i.          contractual drafting;

ii.          the general principles of Turkish contract law; and

iii.          the doctrines of impossibility and excessive hardship under the Turkish Code of Obligations (“TCO”).[1]

In practice, this means that a force majeure analysis under Turkish law is always fact-sensitive and contract-specific. The mere occurrence of a pandemic or a market shock does not automatically discharge contractual obligations. What matters is whether the event makes performance impossible, substantially more onerous, or merely more expensive or inconvenient.

From the Malaysian perspective, the position is similarly fact-sensitive, but the legal architecture is different. Malaysian law does not recognise force majeure as a free-standing statutory doctrine. In most commercial contracts, force majeure operates primarily as a contractual risk-allocation mechanism. Where the contract contains a force majeure clause, the starting point will be the wording of that clause: the events covered, the causation threshold, the notice requirements, and the consequences agreed by the parties. Where the contract is silent, the affected party would usually have to consider the doctrine of frustration, principally under section 57(2) of the Contracts Act 1950.[2]

This distinction is important because frustration under Malaysian law is narrow, exceptional and generally more drastic in consequence than a well-drafted force majeure clause. While both Türkiye and Malaysia require a contract-specific analysis, the commercial lesson is slightly different. In Türkiye, parties must consider the interaction between contractual force majeure, impossibility and excessive hardship under the TCO. In Malaysia, parties should be careful not to assume that commercial difficulty, increased cost or delay will automatically excuse performance unless the contract expressly provides for it.

This article provides a concise overview of how force majeure is approached under Turkish and Malaysian law, how it interacts with related doctrines, and what commercial parties should consider when drafting cross-border agreements. The aim is not only doctrinal clarity, but practical guidance for parties operating in an increasingly volatile commercial environment.

2. THE LEGAL BASIS OF FORCE MAJEURE IN TÜRKİYE AND MALAYSIA

Turkish law does not contain a general statutory definition of force majeure in the Turkish Code of Obligations. Instead, the concept has been developed by doctrine and case law. The central characteristics generally associated with force majeure are:

i.          externality;

ii.          unforeseeability;

iii.          irresistibility / inevitability; and

iv.          a causal connection between the event and the non-performance.

In Turkish practice, force majeure is often used as a contractual risk-allocation mechanism. Parties may define force majeure events expressly, prescribe notice requirements, set out the consequences of a triggering event, and determine whether the obligation will be suspended, extended, renegotiated, or terminated. Where the contract contains a force majeure clause, the first step is always to interpret the clause itself. Turkish courts generally respect party autonomy in this respect, particularly in commercial contracts between sophisticated parties.

However, even where the contract is silent or the clause is narrowly drafted, Turkish law may still provide relief through general principles. The two key statutory provisions are:

i.          TCO Article 136 on impossibility of performance;

ii.          TCO Article 137 on partial impossibility of performance; and

iii.          TCO Article 138 on excessive hardship and adaptation of the contract.[3]

These provisions are especially important in cases where an event does not fully destroy the possibility of performance, but instead alters the commercial balance of the contract.

Malaysia adopts a more contract-centred approach. There is no general statutory definition of force majeure in the Contracts Act 1950. As such, force majeure is usually a matter of contractual construction. If parties have expressly agreed that certain events for example pandemic, epidemic, government action, war, sanctions, export or import restrictions, port closures, transport disruption or supply chain collapse will excuse, suspend or otherwise affect performance, Malaysian courts will generally examine the parties’ agreed wording and the commercial allocation of risk reflected in the clause.

Where there is no force majeure clause, Malaysian law does not simply imply one into the contract. The affected party must instead consider whether the contract has been frustrated under section 57(2) of the Contracts Act 1950. That provision states, in substance, that a contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible or unlawful by reason of an event which the promisor could not prevent, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.[4]

This makes the Malaysian position more binary than the Turkish position. Under Turkish law, the analysis may move between contractual force majeure, statutory impossibility and excessive hardship or adaptation. Under Malaysian law, unless the contract itself provides a flexible solution, the statutory fallback of frustration may result in the contract becoming void rather than merely suspended, adapted or renegotiated.

3. CONTRACTUAL FORCE MAJEURE VS. STATUTORY IMPOSSIBILITY AND FRUSTRATION

A well-drafted force majeure clause is not the same thing as statutory impossibility. Contractual force majeure is, first and foremost, a question of interpretation and allocation of risk. The parties decide in advance what events will excuse performance and what the consequences will be. Statutory impossibility, by contrast, applies where performance becomes impossible for reasons for which the debtor cannot be held responsible.

Under Turkish law, if performance becomes impossible due to a circumstance not attributable to the debtor, the obligation is extinguished pursuant to TCO Article 136. In bilateral contracts, the debtor must return what has already been received, subject to the rules of unjust enrichment. If the impossibility is partial, TCO Article 137 governs the consequences.[5]

In Malaysia, the closest statutory analogue is frustration under section 57(2) of the Contracts Act 1950. The doctrine applies where a supervening event, not caused by either party, makes performance impossible or unlawful, or renders the obligation radically different from what was originally undertaken. In Guan Aik Moh (KL) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Selangor Properties Bhd, the Malaysian Court of Appeal explained that frustration generally requires three elements:

i.          the event must not have been provided for in the contract;

ii.          the event must not be self-induced; and

iii.          the event must render the contractual obligation radically different from what was originally undertaken.[6]

This is a high threshold. Malaysian courts do not treat frustration as a general fairness doctrine or as a mechanism to rescue a party from a bad bargain. If the contract has allocated the risk, or if the event merely makes performance more burdensome, expensive or commercially inconvenient, frustration is unlikely to apply. In that sense, a Malaysian force majeure clause performs an important preventive function: it allows the parties to define in advance the events that will affect performance and to choose commercial consequences that are less drastic than the contract becoming void.

This distinction matters because many commercial disputes are not true cases of impossibility. A party may be able to perform, but only at a much higher cost, with delays, or under heavily altered conditions. In those situations, the more relevant doctrine is usually not force majeure in the strict sense, but rather excessive hardship under TCO Article 138.

For Malaysian-law contracts, the equivalent commercial concern should be addressed by drafting, not assumption. If parties wish to deal with severe cost increases, supply disruption, currency fluctuation, market collapse or regulatory delay, they should consider express hardship, price adjustment, extension of time, renegotiation or termination mechanisms. Without such clauses, the affected party may be left with the narrow doctrine of frustration, which may not be available unless the legal threshold under section 57(2) is satisfied.

4. THE COVID-19 EXPERIENCE IN TÜRKİYE AND MALAYSIA

Turkish courts have dealt extensively with pandemic-related disputes since 2020. The emerging judicial pattern is consistent: COVID-19 may constitute a force majeure event in principle, but it does not automatically excuse every breach. The analysis remains contract-specific and depends on the effect of the pandemic on the particular obligation.[7]

Several first-instance commercial court decisions acknowledged that the pandemic and the measures taken by public authorities could amount to an external and unforeseeable event. For example, the Istanbul and Izmir commercial courts recognized that COVID-19 may constitute force majeure or, where performance is not truly impossible, may justify an excessive hardship analysis under Article 138 of the TCO.[8] The broader message of these decisions is that courts are willing to recognize the exceptional nature of the pandemic, but they still require proof of concrete impact on the contract.

The Court of Cassation has also emphasized the distinction between true impossibility and mere difficulty. The key question is whether the event makes performance impossible, or only more burdensome. Where performance is still possible, even if much harder, the debtor will usually have to rely on the hardship doctrine rather than a force majeure discharge.[9]

This distinction is crucial in commercial contracts. For example, if a supplier can source goods from another market at a higher price, the issue may be hardship rather than impossibility. If, however, the goods cannot be imported because of export bans, sanctions, or closures that directly prevent delivery, the argument for force majeure becomes stronger.

The Malaysian COVID-19 experience also confirms that the occurrence of a pandemic or government restriction does not automatically discharge contractual obligations. The court would still ask whether the specific contractual obligation was prevented, rendered unlawful, or merely made more difficult to perform. Where performance remains legally and physically possible but becomes delayed, more expensive or less profitable, the affected party may face difficulty relying on frustration unless the contract contains an express force majeure, extension of time, hardship, price adjustment or renegotiation mechanism.

During the pandemic, Malaysia also enacted the Temporary Measures for Reducing the Impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Act 2020. Section 7 of the Act provided that the inability of a party to perform certain contractual obligations, due to measures prescribed, made or taken under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 to control or prevent the spread of COVID-19, shall not give rise to the other party exercising its rights under the contract[10]. However, this legislation should be understood as temporary and targeted statutory intervention, not as a permanent replacement for properly drafted force majeure clauses.

The practical lesson for Malaysian contracts is therefore clear: parties should not assume that COVID-19, movement control orders, border closures or supply chain disruption will automatically amount to frustration. The safer approach is to draft expressly for such risks, including the precise consequence of disruption, the period of suspension, notice obligations, mitigation steps and termination rights.

5. FORCE MAJEURE, EXCESSIVE HARDSHIP AND FRUSTRATION: THE MOST IMPORTANT DISTINCTION

The most important doctrinal distinction in Turkish law is between force majeure and excessive hardship.

Force majeure generally concerns a situation in which performance becomes objectively impossible. The event lies outside the debtor’s sphere of control, and the debtor cannot reasonably be expected to perform. By contrast, excessive hardship under TCO Article 138 applies when performance remains possible, but the equilibrium of the contract has been fundamentally disturbed by an extraordinary and unforeseeable event.[11]

Under Article 138, the debtor may request adaptation of the contract. If adaptation is not possible, the debtor may withdraw from the contract; in continuous performance contracts, termination is generally the relevant remedy.

This distinction is particularly important in post-pandemic commercial contracts because many business disruptions did not render performance literally impossible. Instead, they made it significantly more expensive, delayed, or commercially irrational. Turkish law therefore offers two different legal routes:

i.          Article 136 if performance has become impossible; and

ii.          Article 138 if performance has become excessively burdensome but remains possible.

For practitioners, the key takeaway is this: a force majeure clause should not only list events, but also clarify whether the parties intend to treat certain events as excuse events, suspension events, renegotiation triggers, or termination triggers.

Malaysia does not have an equivalent general statutory hardship or adaptation doctrine comparable to Article 138 of the TCO. This is one of the most important distinctions for cross-border drafting. Under Malaysian law, hardship, increased cost, lack of funds, shortage of materials, currency fluctuation or a deterioration in commercial bargain will generally not be enough, by itself, to frustrate a contract.[12]

The Malaysian courts have repeatedly emphasised that performance becoming more onerous or expensive does not automatically amount to frustration. In Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lin Wen-Chih & Anor, the Federal Court observed that a contract does not become frustrated merely because it becomes difficult to perform.[13] Similarly, in Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd v Hariram a/l Jayaram, the Court of Appeal treated the financial crisis and increased commercial burden as insufficient, without more, to discharge the contract.[14]

This creates a practical drafting gap. A situation that may be analysed in Türkiye as excessive hardship or adaptation may not receive the same treatment under Malaysian law unless the contract expressly provides for it. For Malaysian-law contracts, parties should therefore consider including a dedicated hardship clause, price adjustment formula, cost escalation clause, material adverse change clause, renegotiation mechanism, or long-stop termination right. Without such drafting, the party affected by hardship may remain bound to perform despite severe commercial imbalance.

6. NOTICE, MITIGATION, AND GOOD FAITH OBLIGATIONS

Even where force majeure or hardship applies, the debtor is not free from all obligations. Turkish law and contractual practice both impose important ancillary duties.

First, the debtor must notify the other party without delay once the impediment arises. This is expressly relevant under TCO Article 136, which requires the debtor to inform the creditor immediately and take necessary measures to prevent further loss.[15] In practice, commercial force majeure clauses often include more specific notice periods, such as 3, 5, 7, or 10 business days. If the contract sets a deadline, courts will usually expect compliance.

Second, the debtor must mitigate the effects of the event. The duty to act as a prudent merchant is especially important in commercial relationships. A party invoking force majeure should be able to show that it took reasonable steps to minimize the impact of the event, such as sourcing alternative supplies, reorganizing logistics, seeking substitute performance, or applying for regulatory relief.

Third, the principle of good faith plays a central role. A party cannot rely on force majeure opportunistically if the real problem is a commercial loss of profitability or a strategic decision to stop performing. Turkish courts are likely to scrutinize whether the claimed force majeure event truly caused the breach, or whether the debtor was already in default for unrelated reasons.

In Malaysia, notice and mitigation obligations are also critical, but their content will usually depend on the contract. Where a force majeure clause prescribes a notice period, method of service, information requirements or supporting documents, the affected party should comply strictly. Failure to give timely and proper notice may prejudice the party’s ability to rely on the clause, especially where the clause makes notice a condition precedent to relief.

From an evidential perspective, a party relying on force majeure under Malaysian law should be prepared to prove not only the occurrence of the event, but also causation. It should be able to show how the event directly prevented, delayed or materially affected performance. Useful supporting documents may include:

i.          government orders or public authority directions;

ii.          port, shipping, import or export notices;

iii.          supplier or logistics correspondence;

iv.          records of alternative sourcing attempts

v.          internal mitigation records; and

vi.          written updates to the counterparty.

Mitigation should also be expressly built into the clause. In practice, a well-drafted Malaysian force majeure clause should require the affected party to take reasonable steps to reduce the impact of the event, continue partial performance where possible, and resume full performance once the impediment ceases. This reduces the risk of opportunistic reliance on force majeure where the real issue is commercial inconvenience rather than legal or practical impossibility.

7. DRAFTING STRATEGIES FOR COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS

For cross-border commercial contracts, the force majeure clause should be written with precision. The most common drafting mistake is to rely on generic language such as “events beyond the parties’ control” without specifying the legal consequences. A good clause should address at least the following issues:

i. Triggering events

The clause should list examples such as epidemic disease, pandemic, government lockdowns, export/import bans, transport restrictions, supply chain collapse, war, terrorism, sanctions, natural disasters, and similar events. Whether the list is exhaustive or illustrative should be made clear.

ii. Causation threshold

The clause should state that the event must directly prevent or materially delay performance. Merely making performance more expensive should not, unless intended, automatically trigger force majeure relief.

iii. Notice mechanics

The clause should state when notice must be given, in what form, to whom, and with what supporting documents.

iv. Mitigation and cooperation

The clause should require both parties to cooperate, explore alternatives, and minimize losses.

v. Legal consequence

The clause should state whether the contract suspends obligations during the force majeure period, extends the timeline, triggers renegotiation, permits partial performance, or allows termination after a specified period.

vi. Duration threshold

Many contracts provide that if the force majeure event continues beyond a certain period, either party may terminate the agreement. This is especially important in supply, distribution, construction, and long-term service contracts.

For Malaysia-Türkiye cross-border contracts, the drafting should go further by recognising the differences between the two legal systems. A clause that works well under Turkish law may not achieve the same result under Malaysian law if it assumes the availability of judicial adaptation or hardship relief. Where Malaysian law governs, the contract should expressly provide the commercial roadmap.

Accordingly, the parties should consider the following additional drafting points:

i. Modernised triggering events

Modern clauses should consider pandemic, epidemic, quarantine, public health emergency, government action, export and import bans, port closure, transport restriction, sanctions, war, terrorism, cyber disruption, natural disaster, labour disruption and severe supply chain interruption. The clause should also state whether the list is exhaustive or illustrative.

ii. Deliberate causation wording

“Prevent”, “hinder”, “delay”, “materially affect” and “make commercially impracticable” are not the same. Under Malaysian law, where the parties intend relief to apply even when performance is not strictly impossible, the clause should say so expressly.

iii. Separation between force majeure and hardship

Force majeure may deal with prevention or delay, while hardship may deal with severe economic imbalance, cost escalation or market disruption. This distinction is especially useful in Malaysian-law contracts because hardship is not generally implied by statute.

iv. Graduated consequences

Instead of moving immediately from breach to termination, the clause may provide for temporary suspension, extension of time, partial performance, alternative performance, renegotiation, price adjustment, cost-sharing, or termination after a defined long-stop period.

v. Alignment with the wider contract

The force majeure clause should be aligned with other parts of the contract, including payment obligations, delivery timelines, liquidated damages, extension of time, termination, governing law and dispute resolution. In construction, supply, distribution and long-term service contracts, this alignment is often more important than the list of force majeure events itself.

Well-drafted clauses reduce uncertainty, prevent opportunistic reliance on vague hardship claims, and make dispute resolution more predictable.

8. COMMON PITFALLS IN CROSS-BORDER COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS

In Turkish practice, several recurring mistakes appear in cross-border contracts.

i. Assuming that the “force majeure” label is enough

One common mistake is assuming that a generic “force majeure” label will automatically solve the issue. It will not. The court will still examine the clause, the governing law, the factual matrix, and the actual effect on performance.

ii. Failing to distinguish force majeure from hardship

A party may incorrectly argue impossibility when the real issue is economic imbalance. That weakens the claim.

iii. Ignoring notice and documentary requirements

Even a valid event may not help a party that failed to notify on time or failed to document the impact properly.

iv. Drafting the clause too broadly or too narrowly

If the clause is too broad, it may be abused. If too narrow, it may fail to capture real-world disruptions such as pandemics or severe logistical restrictions.

v. Failing to align the clause with the wider contract

A force majeure clause should be aligned with the contract’s other provisions, including termination, suspension, price adjustment, delivery, liquidated damages, extension of time and dispute resolution clauses. It should not stand alone; it must fit into the overall commercial architecture of the agreement.

From the Malaysian perspective, several additional pitfalls should be avoided.

i. Assuming that force majeure exists without an express clause

In Malaysia, the absence of such a clause usually pushes the parties into the narrower and more drastic doctrine of frustration.

ii. Treating increased cost as automatic excus

Increased cost, reduced profitability or supply chain inconvenience will not necessarily excuse performance. Unless expressly drafted, these matters may not satisfy the Malaysian threshold for frustration.

iii. Failing to separate force majeure from hardship

In cross-border contracts involving Malaysian and Turkish parties, this can create uncertainty because Turkish law recognises excessive hardship and adaptation more clearly than Malaysian law. A contract governed by Malaysian law should therefore include a hardship mechanism if the parties want one.

iv. Ignoring the consequences of frustration

If section 57(2) applies, the contract becomes void. Restitutionary consequences may then arise under section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 and, where applicable, sections 15 and 16 of the Civil Law Act 1956. This may be commercially undesirable where the parties would have preferred suspension, renegotiation or partial performance.[16]

v. Treating boilerplate as sufficient

For cross-border contracts, boilerplate language such as “events beyond the parties’ control” is rarely enough. Parties should specify the relevant events, the causation standard, the notice process, the mitigation duties, and the exact consequences of disruption.

9. POST-PANDEMIC LESSONS FOR TÜRKİYE AND MALAYSIA

The post-pandemic period has made one point very clear: commercial contracts must be drafted for stress, not only for normal conditions. Parties should now assume that supply chain disruptions, public health measures, sanctions, border restrictions, and sudden regulatory changes are no longer extraordinary in the practical sense.

For Turkish contracts, this means that the best practice is to combine a tailored force majeure clause with an express hardship/adaptation clause. In other words, parties should not rely solely on a binary “excused or not excused” model. They should consider a graduated response structure:

i.          temporary suspension;

ii.          a duty to negotiate in good faith;

iii.          partial performance;

iv.          price adjustment;

v.          extension of time; and

vi.          if necessary, termination.

This approach is more realistic and commercially balanced. It also aligns better with Turkish law, which recognizes both impossibility and excessive hardship as distinct legal responses to extraordinary events.

For Malaysian contracts, the post-pandemic lesson is that parties should not rely on frustration as a commercial safety net. The threshold is high, the remedy is blunt, and the outcome may be uncertain. Frustration may discharge the parties from further performance, but it does not necessarily produce the most commercially sensible result.

The better approach is to draft for disruption in layers. A Malaysian-law contract should ideally contain both a force majeure clause and a hardship clause. The force majeure clause should address events that prevent or materially delay performance. The hardship clause should address situations where performance remains possible but has become commercially distorted by extraordinary events. Together, these clauses allow parties to manage disruption without immediately defaulting to breach, litigation or termination.

In cross-border Malaysia-Türkiye transactions, this is particularly important. Parties should not assume that the legal consequences under one jurisdiction will mirror the other. A contract should therefore state clearly whether the relevant event gives rise to suspension, extension of time, renegotiation, price adjustment, partial performance, termination, or restitution.

10. CONCLUSION

Under Turkish law, force majeure is not an automatic escape from contractual liability. Its recognition depends on the governing contract, the applicable legal framework, and the exact impact of the extraordinary event on performance. Where performance has become impossible through no fault of the debtor, TCO Article 136 may apply. Where performance is partially impossible, TCO Article 137 may be relevant. Where performance remains possible but excessively onerous, TCO Article 138 may allow adaptation or termination.

For Malaysia, the core lesson is that force majeure must be drafted, not assumed. The law of frustration remains available in exceptional cases, but it is narrow and may result in the contract becoming void. It is not designed to operate as a broad commercial hardship mechanism. Therefore, parties who want flexibility should build that flexibility into the contract itself.

For commercial parties, the lesson is clear: a force majeure clause should be drafted with precision, linked to the contract’s broader risk allocation structure, and supported by clear notice and mitigation mechanisms. In a post-pandemic commercial environment, the most effective clause is not the shortest one, but the one that anticipates real operational disruption and provides a workable response.

A well-drafted Malaysia-Türkiye commercial contract should not only identify extraordinary events, but also provide a practical sequence of response:

i.          prompt notice;

ii.          evidence of impact;

iii.          mitigation;

iv.          temporary suspension;

v.          partial or alternative performance;

vi.          renegotiation;

vii.          price or timeline adjustment; and

viii.          termination only where the disruption continues beyond an agreed threshold.

In a post-pandemic commercial environment, the most useful clause is not necessarily the longest or most heavily negotiated clause. It is the clause that gives parties a workable roadmap when performance is disrupted, preserves commercial relationships where possible, and reduces uncertainty when litigation or arbitration becomes unavoidable.

In short, Turkish and Malaysian law both offer important but different frameworks for dealing with extraordinary events. But those frameworks work best when the contract itself has been thoughtfully drafted.

Authorship Note

This comparative article has been prepared as a joint publication by Nazmi Zaini Chambers (“NZC”) and KAIDE LAW & MEDIATION (“KAIDE”), combining NZC’s Malaysian law perspective with KAIDE’s Turkish law perspective on force majeure, contractual risk allocation, impossibility, hardship and post-pandemic drafting strategies for commercial contracts.

Published Date: 21 May 2026.

References:

[1] Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, Articles 136, 137 and 138.

[2] Contracts Act 1950, section 57(2); Guan Aik Moh (KL) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Selangor Properties Bhd [2007] 4 MLJ 201; [2007] 3 CLJ 695.

[3] Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, Articles 136, 137 and 138.

[4] Contracts Act 1950, section 57(2).

[5] Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, Articles 136 and 137.

[6] Guan Aik Moh (KL) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Selangor Properties Bhd [2007] 4 MLJ 201; [2007] 3 CLJ 695.

[7] T.C. Istanbul 11. Asliye Ticaret Mahkemesi, 2021/1061 E., 2021/28 K.; T.C. Istanbul 5. Asliye Ticaret Mahkemesi, 2023/422 E., 2021/613 K.; T.C. Istanbul 3. Asliye Ticaret Mahkemesi, 2023/120 E., 2021/852 K.; T.C. Istanbul 3. Asliye Ticaret Mahkemesi, 2022/287 E., 2021/237 K.; T.C. Istanbul 18. Asliye Ticaret Mahkemesi, 2023/310 E., 2021/295 K.

[8] T.C. Istanbul 11. Asliye Ticaret Mahkemesi, 2021/1061 E., 2021/28 K.; T.C. Istanbul 5. Asliye Ticaret Mahkemesi, 2023/422 E., 2021/613 K.; T.C. Istanbul 3. Asliye Ticaret Mahkemesi, 2023/120 E., 2021/852 K.; T.C. Istanbul 3. Asliye Ticaret Mahkemesi, 2022/287 E., 2021/237 K.; T.C. Istanbul 18. Asliye Ticaret Mahkemesi, 2023/310 E., 2021/295 K.; T.C. Istanbul Bölge Adliye Mahkemesi 45. Hukuk Dairesi, 2023/1514 E., 2023/1684 K.; Hukuk Genel Kurulu, 2022/537 E., 2022/1179 K.; 3. Hukuk Dairesi, 2022/3043 E., 2022/5665 K.

[9] T.C. Istanbul Bölge Adliye Mahkemesi 45. Hukuk Dairesi, 2023/1514 E., 2023/1684 K.; Hukuk Genel Kurulu, 2022/537 E., 2022/1179 K.; 3. Hukuk Dairesi, 2022/3043 E., 2022/5665 K.

[10] Temporary Measures for Reducing the Impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Act 2020, section 7.

[11] Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, Article 138.

[12] Maxisegar Sdn Bhd v Silver Concept Sdn Bhd [2005] 5 MLJ 1; Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd v Hariram a/l Jayaram [2008] 4 MLJ 852.

[13] Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lin Wen-Chih & Anor [2009] 6 MLJ 293; [2009] 6 CLJ 430.

[14] Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd v Hariram a/l Jayaram [2008] 4 MLJ 852.

[15] Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, Article 136.

[16] Contracts Act 1950, sections 57(2) and 66; Civil Law Act 1956, sections 15 and 16.